Whether the district court erred in limiting the scope of cross-examination of a jailhouse informant, denying the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation

No question identified. : | T, whether the district Qo ONES Bry erted when it im peeperly limited the scope of cross-examination of the jail house informant, thereby denying Mr. Anderson his ceastitutional right to confrontation. TL. Whether the district court reversibly erred in ad mitting highhy prejvdicial and irrelevant evidence describing uncharged, worse crimes, thereby denying Mr. AndersiA his Constitutional Cight toa fait and impartial jury trial. lzmproper Admissign gf text messages2.Impropet Admission af "Lick piove Aate rage Arvg statement, TE, whether the district court reversibly erred when j+ denied Mr. Andersons motion for mistrial after Allewing inadmissible festimeny from a Habitual Felon describing vacharged worse crimes, , thereby denying mr. Anderson his constitutional right tea fair and impartial jury trial. TZ. Whether the Division reversibly erred when it affirmed the district courts decision to not allow sufficient cress txamination of the jail house witness AS constitutional harmless error, Whether the trial error impacted the verdict beyond A reasonable doubt. MY whether the Division reversibly erred when it failed to address the constitutiana lity of the “uncharged, worse crimes” Argument, . VW whether the Divisian reversibly erred when it stated fa(sely: I.The record overwhelmingly supports the prosecutions case And lacks support For defendants assertions.” 2.“There was no error in the proceedings. Withert error, there was no reason to deciart 4 mistrial.” 3. We presume, absent a showing of actual prejudice.” Wi. Whether the Division re versibly erred when it eancluded there was No prejudice te allowing A habitual felon te gemmit Zz QuesTLow (5) PRESENTED perjury in the Form of a fabricated F aise confession that inderparated a "Cictitious roofie*allegati on, thereby denying Mr. Andersen his constitutional vightste a fail and impartial yur trial, equal protection of the Law, and Dve Process of Law. VAT, whether the Division reversibly erred when it validated two essential elements of aileged crime, “Knowledge and “Physically Helplessness, based vpon not-true, ‘made-up Faise Confession statements” by A habitual felon, that Mr. Anderson never contesged to. Whether this violates constitutional rights to Counsel, protections against self-incrimsnation, and Ave process of Law. IX. whether the District Cyurt reversibly erred when if ruled that defense counsel opened the doer to the text messages, when he AiA ayt open fhe daor. whether this violates Fair And imparts a/ Freal rights. Awd FINALLY; X. Whether a Verdict gan constitytianally stand, where a Jury is deprived of tritigal factval evidence, that Mr. Arderson haz never portied Anyone jn bis life time, leaving the Jury to speculate the pass/bility of a rookie’ pele fa Pher'r Verdict. Whether this 1s Uneonstif#vtiinal, and vielates Prings ples af YS. Lansts4v tran, And violates Funtamental fairness af Law. x1, Whether a Partial Acqvittal gives the Court avthority to utilize false, inadmissible evidence. whether the Covats are ndividval and S€ perate, meaning whether a Partial Aege'ttal on One Count specifically avthor;2¢es vst of inadm ‘ssible, fatse evidence anya Secsnd Count, Whether the Second Lount convictian 1s therefore con stitutronally permissible, or if it violates constitutyonal right to a fairand impartial jury trial, 3