Is Nevada's capital sentencing procedure unconstitutional after Hurst v. Florida?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Nevada courts instruct juries that they may consider imposing a death sentence only after finding at least one statutory aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt and further finding that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating factor or factors. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the outweighing step was not an eligibility requirement, but rather a mechanism for the jury to retract a finding of death eligibility. By eliminating the second fact-finding step from the legislatively proscribed death-eligibility process, this holding conflicts with this Court’s rulings in Hurst v. Florida, 136 8. Ct. 616 (2016); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948); and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The questions presented are: 1. Is Nevada’s capital sentencing procedure unconstitutional after Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), because it requires the jury—as a prerequisite to choosing a life or a death sentence—to find that mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the statutory aggravating circumstances, but does not require that finding to be made beyond a reasonable doubt? 2. Does the Nevada Supreme Court’s unforeseeable expansion of the narrow and precise statutory language defining death eligibility violate Furman v. Georgia, and render Nevada’s capital sentencing statute unconstitutionally vague? i 3. Did the Nevada Supreme Court violate petitioner’s constitutional rights by making the outweighing requirement incidental to the jury’s verdict, used only to reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment? ii