Thintinus Noseth Taylor v. United States
SecondAmendment FifthAmendment DueProcess
Whether the Ninth Circuit's low burden of proof for possession of a firearm in cohabitation cases extends the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) beyond its purpose, violates Due Process and chills the exercise of Second Amendment rights of law-abiding individuals to keep and bear arms in defense of hearth and home
QUESTION PRESENTED The Due Process Clause protects individuals from conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Federal law 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) prohibits individuals convicted of felonies or crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year from possessing firearms. However, § 922(g)(1) and its progeny, do not bar these prohibited possessors from cohabitating with individuals or family members who legally possess firearms or from living in a home where firearms are lawfully present. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit’s use of lower burden of proof for constructive possession of firearms under § 992(g)(1) than for other contraband, criminalizes this otherwise noncriminal act. The result is the application of a criminal statute that violates an accused’s Fifth Amendment rights and chills cohabitants’ Second Amendment rights by leaving lawabiding gun owners unaware of how to possess and store their firearms without putting the accused at risk of prosecution and incarceration. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the Ninth Circuit's low burden of proof for possession of a firearm in cohabitation cases extends the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) beyond its purpose, violates Due Process and chills the exercise of Second Amendment rights of law-abiding individuals to keep and bear arms in defense of hearth and home. See Henderson v. United States, 575 U.S. 622 (2015); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). i