Dennis J. Malouf v. Securities and Exchange Commission
Arbitration ERISA Securities LaborRelations JusticiabilityDoctri
What constitutes 'reasonable grounds' to excuse failure to raise Appointments Clause objection before SEC?
QUESTIONS PRESENTED Numerous federal statutes require administrative exhaustion to preserve an issue for review by an Article III court. The Securities Exchange Act (“SEA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(c)(1), and the Investment Advisers Act (“IAA”), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-13(a), require exhaustion but include an express exception where there were “reasonable grounds” for not urging the objection before the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). In Petitioner’s case, the Tenth Circuit’s decision, that there were no “reasonable grounds” to excuse Petitioner’s failure to urge a valid Appointments Clause objection before the SEC, conflicts with decisions of the D.C. Circuit and the Sixth Circuit as to similar statutory exceptions to exhaustion. Other federal statutes, like the Securities Act (“SA”), 15 U.S.C. § 77i(a), require exhaustion but do not have any express exceptions. In Petitioner’s case, the Tenth Circuit concluded it “need not decide” if § 77i(a) is a “jurisdictional condition” or a “claim processing” rule because either way it lacked discretion to excuse Petitioner’s failure. No court has decided the important and recurring questions whether exhaustion is a “claim-processing” rule and whether exhaustion is subject to “equitable exceptions.” The questions presented are: 1. What constitutes “reasonable grounds,” as used in SEA § 78y(@@) and IAA § 80b-13(a), and in other federal statutes, to excuse a failure to urge before the SEC a valid Appointments Clause objection to an unconstitutionally selected administrative law judge? u 2. Isanadministrative exhaustion requirement like that in SA § 77i(a) without any express exceptions, and in other federal statutes, a “jurisdictional condition” to review of a valid Appointments Clause objection by an Article III court or a “claim-processing” rule? 3. Whether “equitable exceptions” may excuse noncompliance with the administrative exhaustion requirement in § 77i(a) of the SA and in other federal statutes that do not contain any express exceptions?