Whether conviction of a federal bribery charge against a state or local official under 18 U.S.C. § 666 requires proof of a quid pro quo where the alleged bribe is a campaign contribution presumptively protected under the First Amendment?

QUESTION PRESENTED 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (the Hobbs Act) makes it illegal to affect commerce by engaging in “extortion,” defined as “obtaining * * * property from another, with his consent * * * under color of official right,” and which includes soliciting or accepting a bribe. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) makes it illegal for federal officials to accept a bribe. In United States v. McCormick, 500 U.S. 257 (1991), this Court held that conviction for extortion under the Hobbs Act requires proof of a quid pro quo where the alleged bribe was a campaign contribution. Subsequent cases have further required proof of a quid pro quo for bribery under § 201. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398 (1999); McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 18 U.S.C. § 666 extends § 201’s prohibition on bribery involving federal officials to bribery of state and local officials and others whose organizations receive federal funds. The courts of appeals, however, are divided regarding whether the required proof of a quid pro quo under the Hobbs Act, § 201 and comparable other statutes likewise extends to § 666. The Question Presented is: Whether conviction of a federal bribery charge against a state or local official under 18 U.S.C. § 666 requires proof of a quid pro quo where the alleged bribe is a campaign contribution presumptively protected under the First Amendment?