Whether timing constitutes an extraordinary circumstance for qualified immunity

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether a panel decision decided nine days before the relevant conduct in question constitutes clearly established law to deprive government officers of qualified immunity. See D. C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 591 (2018) (“We have not yet decided what precedents—other than our own—qualify as controlling authority for purposes of qualified immunity.”). 2. Whether timing constitutes an extraordinary circumstance as articulated by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), such that a police officer may nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity despite the law being clearly established nine days earlier. 3. Whether the Eleventh Circuit erred in holding that a general principal of law announced in Moore v. Pederson, 806 F.3d 1036 (11th Cir. 2015), firmly established with the requisite degree of particularity that the officers violated clearly established law in the particular circumstances they faced.