Whether the Postal Reorganization Act impliedly bars non-APA review, including claims of USPS conduct or failure to follow its own rules

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In two landmark suits against prior Postmasters General, this Court set bedrock principles of judicial review of executive action in equity. Kendall v. U.S. ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838); Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 110 (1902). Kendall applies only to the district court here, and McAnnulty applies to all district courts. The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and the Court’s APA precedents extend judicial review from those suffering “direct injury” (i.e., violation of legal rights) to those arguably within a looser zone of interests. The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 (“PRA”) exempted the Postal Service (“USPS”) from some APA applications. Air Courier Conf. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 523 n.3 (1991), reserved the question of the scope of PRA’s exemption, noting that it “at most” barred APA review. Prior D.C. Circuit precedent holds the PRA to bar all non-APA nonstatutory review except ultra vires review. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits allow non-APA review to continue, including claims that USPS violated its own rules. The courts below extended the D.C. Circuit precedent — which had involved executive or quasi-legislative USPS action — to USPS adjudications, meaning that Article II administrative judges have unreviewable authority to redirect mail and property, in violation of Article III’s vesting federal judicial power in the judiciary. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the PRA impliedly bars non-APA review, including claims of conduct or failure to follow USPS’s own rules. 2. Whether the PRA violates Article III as applied to bar judicial review of USPS adjudications.