Does the causal connection required for standing exist when it is substantially likely that a third party will respond to the defendant's conduct in a way that injures the plaintiff?

QUESTION PRESENTED For a plaintiff to have standing to sue in federal court, “there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted). The question presented is: Is the causal connection required for standing satisfied when it is substantially likely that a third party in the chain of causation will respond to the defendant’s conduct in a way that injures the plaintiff, as held by the D.C., Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, or does the participation of a third party with the ability to act independently almost automatically break the chain of causation, as held by the First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits?