Whether the First Amendment's Religion Clauses prohibit courts from hearing defamation claims that arise from ecclesiastical settings, even when the claims can be resolved using neutral principles of law

QUESTION PRESENTED This Court has held that the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses allow courts to hear some civil claims that arise from ecclesiastical settings—i.e., settings relating to matters of church governance and administration—if those claims can be resolved using neutral principles of law. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-06 (1979). The Court also has held that the Religion Clauses prohibit courts from hearing some other civil claims that arise from ecclesiastical settings, even if those claims can be resolved using neutral principles of law. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012). The Court has left open the question of how the Religion Clauses apply to tort claims, such as claims for defamation. See id. The question presented is: Whether the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses prohibit courts from hearing defamation claims that arise from ecclesiastical settings, even when the claims can be resolved using neutral principles of law.