Should the court adopt the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment by holding that a search of a home(castle) is unreasonable when the implied license operates as the functional equivalent of a general warrant?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW QUESTION 1: Should the court adopt the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment by holding that a search of a home(castle) is unreasonable when (i.e., in those instances for which) the implied license operates as the functional equivalent of a general warrant (i.e., acts similar to a writ of assistance)? QUESTION 2: , Regardless of whether it would be a reasonable or an unreasonable search of a home, plainly, is it a “search” for Fourth Amendment analysis purposes when the government initiates a physical intrusion into the curtilage of a home with a purpose of seeking information? QUESTION 3: With the lone historical exception of performing “service” of a warrant or civil process and apart from a search being unreasonable based on expectation of privacy and apart from whether or not the government’s action exceeds what the implied license permits... Is it an “unreasonable” search when the government initiates a “physical intrusion of the curtilage of home” without a permissible warrant (i.e.,a warrant that contains a particularized description) and the objectively determinable purpose is to seek information about a violation of law? ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED Continued QUESTION 4: For a First Amendment claim that an ordinance unconstitutionality infringes on the fundamental right of free speech, at the summary judgment stage, is it proper to dismiss the claim for lack of standing by drawing an inference that the ordinance does not apply to petitioner because the notice of violation issued for the enforcement action does not directly cite the specific provision(s) being enforced even when the notice references “other objects” and “several signs” (rather than specifically identifying a “cross” and other non-political signs which are restricted by the ordinance)?