Whether RCW 18.130.180(1) and (4), as construed and applied by the Washington Court of Appeals in the absence of a formal physician-patient relationship and a duty of care, are substantially overbroad, violating my First Amendment right to free speech and expression

QUESTION PRESENTED While on-call as a private otolaryngologist, I verbally declined to accept into my care two persons from outlying hospitals, where I was neither on staff nor on call, because I believed such transfers were not appropriate. The Washington State Medical Quality Assurance Commission (MQAC) sanctioned me under RCW 18.130.180 (1) and (4) for my verbal “refusal to aid and consult with fellow physicians” and “refusal to consult with fellow physicians and treat patients”, respectively. Appealing MQAC’s final order to the Washington Court of Appeals (COA), I argued that outside of a physician-patient relationship and its | ensuing duty of care, my verbal “refusal” is not conduct | proscribed by RCW 18.130.180(1) and (4). Affirming the : final order, the COA concluded, “[t]he plain language of | RCW 18.130.180(1) and (4) does not require MQAC to | find a duty of care.” My motion for reconsideration and petition for review, arguing that RCW 18.130.180(1) : and (4) cannot constitutionally prohibit a physician from exercising his professional speech and judgment, were denied by the COA and Washington’s Supreme Court, respectively. The question presented is: Whether RCW 18.130.180(1) and (4), as construed and applied by the Washington Court of Appeals in the absence of a formal physician-patient relationship and a duty of care, are substantially overbroad, violating my First Amendment right to free speech and expression. — ii