Is the statutory claim for contribution in section 113 of CERCLA, including the statute of limitations found in section 1138(g)(3), governed exclusively by the statute's text without reference to 'common law' or other nonCERCLA principles of contribution?

QUESTION PRESENTED This case presents a question that will be resolved by the decision in Government of Guam v. United States, No. 20-382, 2021 WL 77250 (Jan. 21, 2021) (hereinafter “Guam”): Is the statutory claim for contribution in section 113 of CERCLA, including the statute of limitations found in section 1138(g)(3), governed exclusively by the statute’s text without reference to “common law” or other nonCERCLA principles of contribution? In the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1647-48, Congress added § 113(f)-(h) to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (CERCLA). Those provisions established specific and explicit procedures for asserting a claim for “contribution,” displacing the claim that some courts had previously implied from the statute. See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994) (citing district-court cases). Because the Court has already granted review of a case that will consider and decide the foregoing question, which is outcome determinative in this case, petitioners respectfully request that their petition be granted or at least held pending the Court’s decision in Guam for appropriate disposition thereafter.