When the unconstitutionality of an officials' conduct is reasonably obvious, does that suffice to render the violation of those constitutional rights clearly established

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Respondents are jail officials who deliberately left Petitioner Stephen Hammonds, a Type-1 diabetic pre-trial detainee, in solitary confinement for days without providing him the care and insulin needed for his insulin-dependent diabetes. Respondents knew Hammonds suffered from Type I diabetes and were well aware of the life threatening risk associated in depriving Hammonds sufficient insulin to treat his Type-I diabetes. Due to inadequate care for this condition over the course of seventeen (17) days, Hammonds declined into Diabetic Ketoacidosis (“DKA”), suffered severe pain, organ failure, and was finally hospitalized in critical condition. Following his release, Hammonds was diagnosed for the first time with peripheral neuropathy (permanent nerve damage) resulting from insulin deprivation. Petitioner brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Respondents awarding them qualified immunity without ever reviewing the constitutional deprivation for which the immunity was granted. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and found it was not necessary to address the Constitutional deprivation before awarding qualified immunity. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Hammonds’ claim for deliberate indifference failed because his constitutional rights were not clearly established by reference to appellate decisions under these precise circumstances. The Eleventh Circuit’s limitation of deliberate indifference claims directly conflicts with the holdings of the Supreme Court, and other circuits. il Three questions are presented: 1. When the unconstitutionality of an officials' conduct is reasonably obvious, does that suffice to render the violation of those constitutional rights clearly established, as the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have recognized in similar cases, or must there also be binding precedent under the same specific facts, as the Eleventh Circuit held below? 2. Are government officials entitled to qualified immunity so long as there is no prior appellate precedent recognizing the unconstitutionality of an identical fact pattern, as the Eleventh Circuit held below, or can prior precedent establish a clearly established constitutional right despite some factual variation, as this Court, as well as the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Tenth Circuits have held? 3. Did the Eleventh Circuit and District Court err in summarily granting qualified immunity to Respondents without considering substantial factual issues of deliberate indifference in the officer’s actions? ili