Whether a defendant can show prejudice from counsel's deficient performance in rejecting a plea offer where the record reveals no facts suggesting the plea would have been withdrawn or rejected

QUESTION PRESENTED In Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012), this Court held that a defendant who rejects a proffered plea deal as a result of counsel’s deficient performance may demonstrate prejudice by showing that there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have accepted the plea and, as particularly relevant here, that there is no “particular fact or intervening circumstance” suggesting that the plea would have been withdrawn by the prosecution or rejected by the trial court. In this case, however, the Fifth Circuit held that a petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may not prevail on a Lafler/Frye claim even where the record contains no reason to think that the plea would have been withdrawn or rejected and the State does not dispute that fact. Breaking from three other circuits, and acknowledging that Petitioner had “compelling arguments,” the court held that Frye and Lafler are unclear as to whether a defendant must present some sort of additional, “affirmative proof’—beyond his uncontested characterization of the record—that excludes every possible reason that the plea might have been withdrawn or rejected. The question presented is: Whether this Court’s decisions clearly establish that a defendant can show he was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance causing him to reject a plea offer where the defendant contends without contradiction by the State that the record reveals no particular facts or intervening circumstances suggesting that the State would have withdrawn, or the trial court would have rejected, the plea.