FourthAmendment CriminalProcedure Privacy
Whether the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals constitutes an unreasonable application of this Court's clearly established precedent, by inferring facts from a building's description to justify the conclusion that the seizure of computers, not mentioned in the affidavit, containing a surveillance video, did not violate the Fourth Amendment
QUESTION PRESENTED Law enforcement obtained a warrant to search a business. The affidavit in support of the warrant application did not include a request to seize computers. Nor did it describe any facts tending to support even an inference that the business had any surveillance equipment or computers. They seized computers and video surveillance equipment containing a video that was introduced into evidence. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined that probable cause existed to seize the computer and surveillance equipment based solely on inferences drawn from the affidavit’s description of the building searched. Based on this Court’s decisions in Nathanson v. United States, 290 US. 31 (1933); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); and United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989), the question presented is: Whether the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals constitutes an unreasonable application of this Court’s clearly established precedent, by inferring facts from a building’s description to justify the conclusion that the seizure of computers, not mentioned in the affidavit, containing a surveillance video, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.