Does the Second Circuit's opinion conflict with the D.C. Circuit and this Court's FSIA jurisprudence?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Does the Second Circuit’s opinion in Rukoro et al v. Federal Republic of Germany, 976 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2020) conflict with the opinion of the D.C. Circuit in Agudas Chasider Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n, 528 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 2008)(“Chabad”), and four decades of this Court’s FSIA jurisprudence, from Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1983) to Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. 134, 141-42 (2014)? 2. Under FSIA’s_ takings exception, §1605(a)(3), which requires that jurisdiction lie over “any case” in which rights in qualifying properties are “in issue,” does the “based-uponan-act” language of the preceding commercialactivity section, §1605(a)(2), apply also to the takings exception, even though such a requirement is not found in the plain language of the takings exception? 3. Under FSIA’s_ takings exception, §1605(a)(3), does the commercial-activity exception’s jurisdictional requirement, of §1605(a)(2), that some “gravamen” of a claim must relate to the commercial activity, also apply to the takings exception, even though such a requirement is not found in the plain language of the takings exception? 4, Even assuming the commercial activity’s exception “based-upon-an-act” or “gravamen” standard were applicable to the takings exception, is the mass harvesting of bodies in violation of international law and sale of those body parts in the U.S. an element of the claims’ u core allegations or “gravamen” of the case, such that the sale of the skulls and body parts by a German agent to the American Museum of Natural History (““AMNH”) in New York City provide a sufficient jurisdictional basis under the takings exception? 5. Can a case such as this one properly have more than one “gravamen,” as opposed to the incorrect single gravamen standard applied by the Second Circuit? 6. Does the takings exception requirement that the property in question “be present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state” require that the commercial activity must continue “to be carried on” as of the date of the filing of the action, or (as the use of the past participle “carried on” indicates), may the subject property present in the U.S. be here in connection with a completed commercial activity “carried on” in the U.S. at a prior time?