Securities Patent Privacy JusticiabilityDoctri
Does Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) afford district courts discretion to reweigh the evidence when evaluating a new trial motion
QUESTION PRESENTED The district court vacated Petitioner’s convictions for securities fraud and conspiracy and ordered a new trial after concluding that the evidence weighed so heavily against the verdict that there was a serious risk of a miscarriage of justice and that an innocent person may have been convicted. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the district court lacked discretion to weigh the evidence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a), unless there was evidentiary or instructional error or “the evidence was patently incredible or defied physical realities.” The question presented is: Does Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) afford district courts discretion to reweigh the evidence when evaluating a new trial motion, as eleven other federal courts of appeals have held, or does the rule require that a court “must defer to the jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence,” unless there was evidentiary or instructional error or “the evidence was patently incredible or defied physical realities,” as the Second Circuit held in this case?