Whether a Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loan is an important national policy which gives license to a lender's forcible entry and seizure of an occupied home prior to foreclosure and sale and without court order—in violation of a forcible entry and detainer statute (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-40-101, e¢ seg.) and the Fourth Amendment. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 67 (1992); and whether federal courts can enforce an FHA deed of trust signed by a decedent and purportedly granting the lender a possessory right to forcibly enter and direct law enforcement to search an occupied home. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED This case is timely and of national importance. Ten million homeowners are behind on their mortgage payments and 2.7 million of 11-million Governmentbacked mortgages are in forbearance.’ Housing and Urban Development (HUD) practices are an inevitable exemplar to all lenders. Acting as the named lender, HUD broke in, changed the lock, and an agency attorney falsely stated to law-enforcement that HUD had foreclosed and taken possession of the Golz-home (forcible entry). HUD then requested a search and opened every door in the home for the police officer (search). The lower courts struck Petitioner's defenses denying discovery for his extensive body of facts, positing that a HUD foreclosure is protected under a congressional authorization of broad equitable relief to serve an important national policy and that the forcible entry was permitted by the deed of trust. Colorado is a “Tien-theory” state where the Colorado Supreme Court “prohibits a mortgagee from acquiring possession of mortgaged property until a foreclosure and sale have occurred.” Martinez v. Continental Enter., 730 P.2d 308, 314 (Colo. 1986) (en banc). 1. Whether a Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loan is an important national policy which gives license to a lender's forcible entry and seizure of an occupied home prior to foreclosure and sale and without court order—in violation of a forcible entry and detainer statute (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-40-101, e¢ seg.) and the Fourth Amendment. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 67 (1992); and whether federal courts can enforce an FHA deed of trust signed by a decedent and purportedly granting the lender a possessory right to forcibly enter and direct law enforcement to search an occupied home. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961). 2. Whether equitable estoppel will lie to prevent the Secretary of HUD, acting pursuant to the National Housing Act's sue-and-be-sued clause (12 U.S.C. § 1702) as named lender on an FHA-insured loan, from unjustly evading an authorized, written, loan-payoff agreement that meets the requirements of a contract; and if estoppel is a defense to foreclosure, whether facts pleaded that satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 9(b), which include documentation that HUD administrators fraudulently represented agency regulations to reject Petitioner's tender of the loan payoff, can be dismissed on a Rule 12(f) motion prior to discovery. 3. Whether a defendant whom was the former executor and sole devisee of a decedent's estate has standing to appeal the denial of a remedy for his palpable injury traceable to the District Court's affirmative acts asserting administrative authority over a probate estate for an eleven-month period following the filing in the State Court of a closing statement conforming to state law and executed with his sworn oath that the estate had been fully administered. i Joseph R. Biden, “Fact Sheet: Biden Administration Announces Extension of COVID-19 Forbearance and Foreclosure Protections for Homeowners.” The White House, Feb. 16, 2021, .