Does the Rooker-Feldman doctrine apply to interlocutory orders that are entered in state court proceedings that end after the federal court action is commenced?

Question Presented is: Does the Rooker-Feldman doctrine apply to interlocutory orders that are entered in state court proceedings that end after the federal court action is commenced? Il. Under state law, state judges who violate constitutional rights while acting in their official capacity are subject to suit in an action for declaratory relief. Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296 (1998). In the district court petitioners alleged that practices adopted by the judicial respondents in Sowell v. DiCara, 161 Conn. App. 102, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 909 (2015), are unconstitutional and that petitioners’ challenges to the practices in the state courts were dismissed as being barred by il Rule 72-1(b) of the Connecticut Rules of Appellate Procedure and Connecticut “binding precedent” doctrine. The district court dismissed petitioners’ claim for declaratory relief under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The district court and the panel concluded that the claim was barred even though there was no state court judgment determining the issue and even though petitioners had no opportunity to have the claim determined on the merits in the state courts. Petitioners also alleged that they were denied procedural due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment when the judicial respondents invoked Rule 72-1(b) and Connecticut “binding precedent” doctrine to bar their constitutional claims. The district court and the panel concluded that the procedural due process claim was barred even though there was no state judgment determining the claim and even though the claim did not arise until the Connecticut Supreme Court denied petitioners’ access to the courts to litigate petitioners’ constitutional claims. iii The Second Question Presented is: Does the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bar district court jurisdiction over claims petitioners did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the state courts? Ill. Petitioners sought damages from the respondent lawyers, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, for the violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court concluded that the respondent lawyers were not state actors under § 1983. The panel affirmed without specifically addressing the issue. The Third Question Presented is: Is a lawyer who is authorized by the State to regulate the speech of an adverse party a state actor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?