Is it a violation of the Federal Arbitration Act for a state court to dismiss an arbitration due to the resignation of an arbitrator so that a pending motion to invoke an FAA Section 5 replacement arbitrator can be denied or rendered 'moot'?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Question 1: Is it a violation of the Federal Arbitration Act for a state court to dismiss an arbitration due to the res' ignation of an arbitrator so that a pending motion to invoke an FAA Section 5 replacement arbitrator can be denied or rendered “moot”? _ Section 5 of the FAA requires the trial court to appoint an arbitrator if there is a lapse in the naming of : an arbitrator “for any reason.” This section creates a more efficient arbitration process by minimizing delays and mechanical breakdowns in replacing arbitrators who have died or resigned for any reason. However, it is subject to the parties’ contract, which should be rigorously enforced according to its terms. (Section 2) Therein lies the tension between expeditious arbitrator replacement to continue the arbitration and terms which stipulate forums or arbitrators “integral” to the contract which may be unavailable, thus voiding the contract. The circuits are split on favoring the intent to arbitrate over the integral term exception, which may void the contract where a specific arbitration forum or arbitrator deemed “integral” is not available. In this case, the DC Court of Appeals implicitly created another circuit split inconsistent with the goals of the FAA, dismissing Petitioner’s arbitration contract and __also her case where an arbitrator who was not integral to the contract resigned. This decision upends the ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED—Continued power and force of FAA Section 5, making arbitration contracts vulnerable to attack whenever an arbitrator dies or resigns. Question 2: Is it a violation of the Federal Arbitration Act for ; a state court to dismiss an arbitration to prevent a party from asserting the appropriate evident partiality . and disclosure standard for her arbitration contract, rendering moot a motion to disqualify a corrupt arbi; trator? ; : Section 10 of the FAA requires that an arbitration : award be vacated “where there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators.” 9 U.S.C. Section 10(a)(2). This Court likewise instructs that arbitrators “not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even’ the appearance of bias. We cannot believe that it was the purpose of Congress to authorize litigants to sub-__; mit their cases and controversies to arbitration boards that might reasonably be thought biased against one litigant and favorable to another.” Reference is also made to the “simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias.” Commonwealth Coating : Corp. v. Cont Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968). Here the DC Court of Appeals implicitly deepened , the considerable split among circuits regarding the standard to be used for evident partiality and how related disclosures should be handled. Unlike other iii QUESTIONS PRESENTED—Continued appellate circuits, the Court of Appeals held that Petitioner could not object to Respondents’ failure to disclose potential bias and conflict of interest even when it resulted in substantive changes to her arbitration contract and appeal rights. Question 3: Is it a violation of the Federal Arbitration Act for a state court to dismiss an arbitration because a party will not agree to the arbitration panel’s substantive rewrite of the arbitration contract? Section 10 of the FAA provides that a United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration where the arbitrators exceeded their powers. The analysis of what constitutes arbitrators exceeding their powers varies among circuits and courts. The DC Court of Appeals readily endorsed the rewrite of Petitioner’s arbitration contract by a newly assembled tripartite panel, an act frequently considered in excess of an arbitrator’s authority. The appellate court dismissed Petitioner’s case when she objected to the panel’s rewrite in order to maintain the integrity of he