Does an attorney violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to autonomy by admitting, over the defendant's objection, that the defendant ordered a shooting of the victim, thereby conceding the actus reus of the crime?

QUESTION PRESENTED In McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), this Court held that the Sixth Amendment grants criminal defendants a right to “autonomy” that permits them to “maintain innocence” and precludes their lawyers from conceding to “criminal acts” over their objection. Jd. at 1509. Defendants have the right “to avoid * * * the opprobrium that comes with admitting” criminal acts and “to make fundamental choices about [their] own defense.” Jd. at 1508, 1511. Since McCoy was decided, federal and state courts have struggled to define the contours of the right to autonomy. A minority, including the Second Circuit in the decision below, has held that this right is violated only when an attorney unilaterally concedes guilt; here, the Second Circuit affirmed the petitioner’s murder-for-hire conviction where his lawyer conceded, over his objection, that he ordered his associates to shoot (but not kill) the victim. Other courts have held that a lawyer may not unilaterally concede any element of an offense—even elements like the location of the crime. A third group of courts has taken a middle approach, holding that the right to autonomy encompasses certain elements of an offense, like the actus reus, but not elements that are arguably less central to a conviction. Finally, courts are split on the types of cases that implicate McCoy; some, but not others, have limited it to the capital context. The question presented is: Does an attorney violate a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to autonomy by admitting, over the defendant’s objection, that the defendant ordered a shooting of the victim, thereby conceding the actus reus of the crime?