Does the Arkansas DNA testing statute, as construed by the Arkansas Supreme Court, prevent Petitioner from meaningfully accessing the State's post-conviction remedies by denying him potentially exculpatory DNA testing in a manner that is fundamentally unfair, and in violation of his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and his right to access courts under the First Amendment?

QUESTION PRESENTED Petitioner, Stacey Eugene Johnson, was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1993 Sevier County, Arkansas murder of Carol Heath. Petitioner has always maintained his innocence of this crime. Untested physical evidence collected from the crime scene points to another man’s guilt. Arkansas law provides a right to DNA testing pursuant to Act 1780 (codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-201, et seq.). Petitioner sought DNA testing on certain probative items of crime scene evidence under the provisions of 2001 Ark. Act 1780. Petitioner showed, as required by that statute, that the results of DNA testing may produce new material evidence that supports a theory of actual innocence and raises a_ reasonable probability that he did not commit the crime. Despite satisfying this required showing, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in a 5-2 opinion, affirmed the circuit court’s denial of DNA testing. The question presented is: Does the Arkansas DNA testing statute, as construed by the Arkansas Supreme Court, prevent Petitioner from meaningfully accessing the State’s post-conviction remedies by denying him potentially exculpatory DNA testing in a manner that is fundamentally unfair, and in violation of his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and his right to access courts under the First Amendment?