Whether, considering the operation and effect of Florida's capital sentencing scheme, the Due Process Clause requires those latter two determinations to be made beyond a reasonable doubt

QUESTION PRESENTED Under the Due Process Clause, determinations as to both elements and their “functional equivalents” must be made beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-85, 490, 494 n.19 (2000). Further, in ascertaining which determinations are the functional equivalents of elements, the appropriate analysis concerns the operation and effect of the statutory scheme at issue. See, e.g., id. at 494-96. For instance, in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 603-05, 609 (2002), this Court concluded that, considering the operation and effect of Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme, the determination as to whether one or more aggravating circumstances existed was the functional equivalent of an element. The crucial statutory provision in Ring provided that, in addition to finding “one or more aggravating circumstances,” the factfinder had to determine whether “there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F) (2001). In contrast, the crucial statutory provision in the present case provides that, in addition to finding “at least one aggravating factor,” the factfinder has to determine (1) whether “sufficient aggravating factors exist,” and (2) whether “aggravating factors exist which outweigh the mitigating circumstances,” Fla. Stat. § 921.141(2) (2017). The question presented is: Whether, considering the operation and effect of Florida’s capital sentencing scheme, the Due Process Clause requires those latter two determinations to be made beyond a reasonable doubt. ii STATEMENT OF