Dion Alexander v. United States
Environmental SocialSecurity Securities Immigration
Can an appeal waiver in a Type-C plea agreement bar a claim that the district court's rationale for approving the agreement was clearly erroneous?
QUESTIONS PRESENTED Attorneys and judges often misunderstand Type-C plea agreements. When the parties agree to a sentence under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), their agreement is not effective unless the district court finds the sentence reasonable in light of the otherwiseapplicable Guidelines range. But when that safeguard fails, errors have gone unchallenged or held subject to appeal waivers. United States v. Sutton, 962 F.3d 979 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Williams, 682 F. App’x 453 (6th Cir. 2017). Here, the district court approved the agreement based on its clearly erroneous finding that the sentence mooted petitioner’s desire to seek coram nobis relief as to two state convictions. Notwithstanding Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019), in which this Court recognized that appellate waivers do not apply to challenges to the validity of the plea agreement, the Fourth Circuit summarily rejected petitioner’s appeal in an unreported per curiam opinion. Its rationale effectively precludes appellate review any time a district court errs in accepting a Type-C plea agreement, because the resulting sentence will by definition fall within the appeal waiver. Petitioner presents two questions. 1. Can an appeal waiver in a Type-C plea agreement bar a claim that the district court’s rationale for approving the agreement was clearly erroneous? 2. Is a plea agreement knowing and voluntary when the district court gives the defendant clearly erroneous assurances regarding matters that the defendant indicates are critical to his assent?