Whether the Eighth Amendment categorically permits the degree of pain caused by hanging

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the Eighth Amendment categorically permits the degree of pain caused by hanging—including sensations of drowning and_ suffocation—or whether, as this Court held in Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1126 (2019), “[d]istinguishing between constitutionally permissible and impermissible degrees of pain .. . is a necessarily comparative exercise” that requires examining viable alternative methods of execution. 2. Whether Bucklew’s statement that a State need not “be the first to experiment with a new method of execution” permits a State to categorically reject an alternative method with a proven record of ending life effectively and humanely in the medical aid-in-dying context on the ground that other States have not used that method in the execution context. 3. Whether the Sixth Circuit, contrary to Bucklew’s admonition, has “overstated” an inmate’s burden of identifying an available alternative method by permitting a State to claim that a drug is “unavailable” even if the State has made no attempt—let alone a goodfaith effort—to obtain the drug from the ready and willing supplier an inmate has identified. @