Whether government defendants are subject to the same voluntary-cessation standard as private defendants

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Rentberry, which operates a website that allows landlords and potential tenants to communicate through an auction-style bidding process, and Delaney Wysingle, a Seattle landlord, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge Seattle’s ban on rentbidding websites as violating their First Amendment rights. On the eve of oral argument in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Seattle repealed the ordinance and replaced it with an ordinance ordering studies of the effect of rent-bidding websites on the rental housing market. The intent of the studies is to justify further regulation to limit or prohibit rentbidding websites. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the case as moot, holding that it applied a presumption of “good faith” to the city’s voluntary cessation of the challenged practices and that Rentberry and Wysingle were not entitled to rely on nominal damages to avoid mootness because they were only implicitly requested via a prayer for “any such further relief that the court deems proper.” The questions presented are: 1. Is a government defendant that voluntarily ceases challenged unconstitutional action entitled toa greater presumption of “good faith” than a private defendant who voluntarily ceases challenged conduct? 2. Under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(c), are successful civil rights plaintiffs proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 entitled to recover nominal damages as symbolic vindication of their rights regardless of whether they specifically request them in the prayer for relief?