No. 20-5435

Garnett Lloyd v. United States

Lower Court: Eleventh Circuit
Docketed: 2020-08-20
Status: Denied
Type: IFP
Response WaivedIFP
Tags: categorical-approach chevron-deference cyberstalking federal-offense sex-offender-registration sorna sorna-interpretation specified-offense-against-minor
Key Terms:
AdministrativeLaw DueProcess Securities Privacy
Latest Conference: 2020-09-29
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether SORNA's definition of 'sex offense' includes federal offenses not listed in § 20911(5)(A)(iii)

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED For a criminal offense to require registration under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SSORNA”), 34 U.S.C. § 20901 ef seq., it must fit the definition of “sex offense” in 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A). A “sex offense” is a federal offense listed in 34 U.S.C.§ 20911(5)(A) (iii), a military offense listed in 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A) (iv), “a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another,” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(ji), or “a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor,” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A) (i). A “criminal offense” is, in turn, a “[s|tate, local, tribal, foreign, ... military, ... or other criminal offense.” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(6). The Petitioner was convicted of cyberstalking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B), which is not one of the federal offenses listed in 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A) (iii). Nevertheless he was ordered to register as a sex offender under SORNA because the lower courts, applying a non-categorical, approach to interpret the statutory text, concluded that his offense is “a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor.” The questions presented are: I. Whether the definition of “sex offense” in 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A) includes federal offenses other than those listed in 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A) (iii). II. Whether courts must apply a categorical approach or approach to determine if an offense is “a specified offense against a minor” under 34 USS.C. § 20911(5)(A) ii) and 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7). i III. In answering the second question, whether courts must afford deference under Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statute in the National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030 (July 2, 2008), otherwise known as the SMART Guidelines. ii INTERESTED PARTIES There are no patties to the proceeding other than those named in the caption of the case.

Docket Entries

2020-10-05
Petition DENIED.
2020-09-03
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 9/29/2020.
2020-08-25
Waiver of right of respondent United States to respond filed.
2020-08-17
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due September 21, 2020)

Attorneys

Garnett Lloyd
Kristen Leigh Gartman RogersFederal Defenders Organization, Petitioner
Kristen Leigh Gartman RogersFederal Defenders Organization, Petitioner
United States
Jeffrey B. WallActing Solicitor General, Respondent
Jeffrey B. WallActing Solicitor General, Respondent