Ivan Soto-Barraza and Jesus Lionel Sanchez-Meza v. United States
FifthAmendment Privacy
Can a conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery and attempted interference with commerce by robbery stand if the jury was instructed on the elements of Hobbs Act extortion instead of Hobbs Act robbery, thus fatally amending the indictment?
QUESTION PRESENTED The Hobbs Act defines extortion, in relevant part, as requiring the wrongful use of violence or fear in order to induce a person to consent to part with property to which the aggressor has no right. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (b)(2). In contrast, robbery occurs against the will of the rightful property owner. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). This Court has held that the Hobbs Act uses the phrase “with his consent,” to distinguish extortion from robbery, and “consent’ simply signifies the taking of property under circumstances falling short of robbery.” Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1435 (2016). The question presented, on which the Ninth Circuit conflicts with the plain text of the Hobbs Act and this Court’s holding in Ocasio v. United States is: Can a conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery and attempted interference with commerce by robbery stand if the jury was instructed on the elements of Hobbs Act extortion instead of Hobbs Act robbery, thus fatally amending the indictment? i