Does FOIA-exemption-(b)(7)(A)-apply-to-monitoring-of-individual

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW In 2017, plaintiff Daniel Cvijanovich requested records pertaining to himself from the United States Secret Service, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. The Secret Service denied his request categorically, on the grounds that disclosing the records could reasonably be expected to interfere with an enforcement proceeding, 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(7)(A). Pet. App. C. . Cvijanovich was the subject of federal criminal prosecutions in 2006 and 2007, in which the Secret Service was heavily involved. Pet.App. B, 2. Since his : release from prison in 2008, Cvijanovich has not been involved in any enforcement proceedings. The Secret Service monitors Cvijanovich via periodic contact and regards this monitoring as an “enforcement proceeding” exempting the agency from disclosing any records. Id. For this, the agency relies on the 5" Circuit's decision in Moorefield v. U.S. Secret Service, 611 F.2d 1021 (1980). Oe After Cvijanovich filed suit in the U.S. District Court of North Dakota, where he resides, the Secret Service released some of his records, with heavy redactions : based on a variety of FOIA exemptions. Other classes of records continue to be withheld categorically under the Moorefield exemption. Id., 3-4. In addition to challenging the 5™ Circuit's construction in Moorefield, Cvijanovich also challenged the agency's use of exemptions (b)(5) (“inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency”) and (b)(7)(E) (regarding the disclosure of law enforcement techniques and procedures that could reasonably be , expected to risk circumvention of the law). Cvijanovich argued that (b)(5) was intended by Congress to apply to civil litigation with a government agency, whereas the Secret Service is applying it to criminal prosecution. He argued that the (b)(7) (E) redactions were too sweeping and required in camera review by the district court, citing an example of one redacted document he had previously encountered whole, which made no risky disclosures of techniques and procedures, as well as a lL publicly available document which describes in detail many of the techniques and . procedures the agency is trying to shield from him. The district court rejected Cvijanovich's arguments, declined to conduct in camera review, and granted the agency's motion for summary judgment. Pet. App. , B. Cvijanovich appealed to the 8 Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ‘District Court in a one paragraph opinion, without any independent analysis of the arguments. Pet. App. A. Cvijanovich filed a petition for rehearing, pointing out that the 8 Circuit panel had failed to conduct a true de novo review of the lower court's ruling and asking it to do so. The panel denied the request for rehearing. Pet. App. D. . . ; The Questions Presented are: : : 1. Does FOIA exemption (b)(7)(A) apply to the Secret Service's monitoring of an individual, absent the existence of any actual enforcement proceeding involving that individual? ‘ 2. Does FOIA exemption (b)(5) apply to memoranda and letters created in a prosecutorial context, or only to those created in a civil litigation context? 3. Does FOIA exemption (b)(7)(B) apply to interviews and psychiatric evaluations when an agency's operational framework for that kind of ; is already described in public documents? 4. Is it an abuse of discretion for a district court to decline in camera ; review in a FOIA case where the plaintiff has provided evidence that _ a at least one redacted record doesn't satisfy the exemption cited by the . agency? 5. Is it an abuse of discretion for an appeals court to write a too perfunctory opinion when the standard of review is de novo?