Are court-appointed attorneys state actors for 42 USC 1983 claims?

question presented is rather court appointed attorneys and public defenders are or should be considered people acting under color of law for purposes of 42 USC 1983 claims and if brought into the courts jurisdiction for fraud or participation in a civil conspiracy rather they should be covered by immunity. : II. The trial and appellate court ruled that the indigent plaintiffs second ; action is barred by res judicata because dismissal of the first complaint was not appealed and as such is a dismissal on the merits. The second question presented is rather the court should consider a dismissal not appealed by an indigent litigant, whom was approved to proceed in forma pauperis, a dismissal on the merits if he is unable to pay for the cost. III. The trial and appellate court ruled that the plaintiffs second action is barred by res judicata because it contains the same subject matter of the first complaint. The third question presented is rather a second action based on the same subject matter and injuries but containing new evidence and causes of action that were previously concealed by a defendant or interested party is barred by res judicata. IV. The trial and appellate court ruled that the issues presented in the second complaint should have been litigated in the first action because the plaintiff should have been aware that his court appointed attorney had conspired to injure him because he waited to object instead of doing so immediately when asked by the plaintiff. The fourth question presented is rather injurious actions taken by an agent on behalf of his principal rather completely unknown, known but the motives unknown, or assumed to be in the principal's best interest should put the principal on notice of a cause of action against the agent. V. The trial and appellate court ruled that the plaintiff's complaint should’ve been litigated in the first action because the record filed as evidence in the ii complaint shows Judge Gibson and Mr Kandel agreeing to waive his rights in exchange for a bench trial. The fifth question presented is rather a party who was present for but, did not hear or take part in a conversation between parties conspiring to injure him, is on notice of the cause of action for purposes of the second complaint to not be barred by res judicata in a second action. VI. The trial and appellate court ruled that the prosecutors and judges in this action were immune from suit for actions taken in the course of their duties. The sixth question presented is if when a civil conspiracy or fraud upon the court occurs rather the judges and prosecutors who participate in the conspiracy or fraud would lose their immunity like attorneys. VII. The trial and appellate court ruled that the Ohio Attorney General and United States Attorney General we’re immune from suit for the declaratory and injunctive relief the plaintiff seeks. The seventh question presented is rather attorney generals are immune from suit for injunctive and declaratory relief. VIII. The trial court held that Judge Gibson was absolutely immune from suit. They said that the plaintiff had failed to show that he acted in a nonjudicial capacity or in absence of all jurisdiction. The eighth question presented is rather everything a judge does while court is in session including acts of fraud are considered judicial acts. IX. Originally, it was required for a judge to claim or be afforded judicial immunity for acts that injure a litigant in the course of the judge’s duties that the actions complained of be inside of his his jurisdiction. Precedent from recent cases has changed that to rather the court had subject matter jurisdiction at the time the actions were taken. The ninth question presented is rather precedent has stretched the scope of the judicial immunity beyond the framers intent by changing the requirement of the act being done within the judicial officers jurisdiction to rather the court had subject matter jurisdiction at the time of the action