Does the 11th Circuit decision conflict with Martinez v. Ryan?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED QUESTION #1: Does the I !th Circuit decision conflicts with this Court's decision in Martinez v. Ryan, (2012), since it ignores that in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), the Court held: [t]hat where, under state law, ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing those claims if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, counsel in that proceeding was ineffective pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)? UESTION #2 Does the 11th Circuit procedural bar conflicts with this Court's decision in Cuyler v. Sullivan, . (1980), since it ignores that in Cuyler v. Suilivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), the Court established that [t]o show ineffectiveness, a petitioner must demonstrate that his defense attorney had an actual conflict of interest, and that this conflict adversely affected the attorney's performance? QUESTION #3: The 6th Amendment right guarantees conflict-free effective assistance of counsel and does not afford the defendant the hybrid right to simultaneously represent himself and be represented by counsel, while the Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 prohibits a representation involving a potential conflict of interest unless and until the attorney has disclosed the potential conflict, in writing, to his client and thereafter received the client's written consent to undertake or continue that representation. The question is: When a defendant is represented by multiple circuit defender's and subsequently files a pro se post-conviction collateral attack raising substantial ineffectiveness federa! constitutional claims for failure of a succession of attorney's from the same circuit defender’s office to raise it; Should the principles underlying this Rule be discounted in a criminal proceeding, where 6th Amendment right to conflict-free effective assistance of counsel is involved? QUESTION #4: Does the constitutional protections of effective assistance of counsel on only appeal as of right in . Evitts v. Lucey, (1985) and Douglas y. California, (1963), extend to filing a timely Motion for Reconsideration on only appeal of right? : If so, and appellate circuit defender does not withdraw in writing to allow petitioner to file a pro se Motion for Reconsideration on direct appeal to resolve his constitutional questions, can such noncompliance, if substantiated, procedurally bar a pro se habeas petitioner from having substantial claim(s) heard by a federal court? (3) | | UESTION #5: : : The State elected to indict and try Petitioner on 3 Felony Murder counts and Vehicular Homicide : for the same victim. Georgia is a proximate cause state, and in virtually all of Georgia's many homicide statutes, including vehicular homicide statutes, the General Assembly has employed the same or very similar causation phrasing; The question is: Does the 11th Circuit procedural bar conflicts with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), since it ignores that in Jackson v. Virginia, this Court held: in a challenge to a state court conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief...if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at trial no rational trier of facts could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in terms of the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law? QUESTION #6: Under the procedural aspects of the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause, when a state habeas judge verbatim adoption prepared by a prevailing party contains internal evidence suggesting that the judge may not have read them; Is the state court's fact-finding procedure, hearing, and proceeding full, fair, and adequate if [t]he order is an artifact of [the State's] having drafted [it] . with specific intent of not producing a fair and impartial assessment of the facts and law, and deliberately glossed over and camouflaged signific