Does a Federal Court's denial of a State prisoner's right to statutory tolling under 2244(d)(2) or 2244(d)(1)(B) effectively suspend the Great Writ in violation of Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . Although the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has denied 60(b) motions reopening Habeas petitions, most circuits have used 60(b) to reopen untimely dismissals, that were later proved to be erroneously dismissed. Further more unlike the Tenth Circuit, other circuits let prisoners bring their tolling argument in subsequent proceedings. The questions presented are: . 1) Does a Federal Court's denial of a State prisoner's right to statutory tolling under 2244(d)(2) or 2244(d)(1)(B) effectively suspend the Great Writ in violation of Article |, Section 9 of the United States Constitution? 2) Did the District Court abuse its discretion by not considering the tolling effect if any of . ; pending applications in State Court? . 3) Is the petitioner's "Motion to Reconsider" filed within the AEDPA's (1) year grace period, a properly filed motion that tolls a State prisoner's limitation period under 2244(d)(2)? : 4) Did the State Court's failure to enter an appealable order on petitioner's Habeas petition constitute an impediment, under 2244(d)(1)(B)? 5) Does the State Court's denial of counsel to appeal Habeas petition, in violation of State law (K.S.A. 22-4506(c) and Kansas Supreme Court.Rule 183(m), consitute a State created impediment under 2244(d)(1)(B)? ; 6) Was petitioner's "Notice of Appeal" a properly filed application to toll limitation period under 2244(d)(2)? 7) Does a District Court dismissing a State prisoner's original 2254 as untimely prevent him from challenging timeliness in a subsequent petition? i