Did the trial court permit prejudicial error by allowing the jury to find first-degree murder without specific findings of fact on each required element?

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED ; Petitioner's first degree murder conviction was invalid under People v. Chiu as there was no basis to find that the jury did not rely an aiding and abetting under the natural and probable consequences theory as arqued by the prosecutor. The Trial Court read the verdict forms Count 1, for first degree murder, with no special findings; Count 2, first degree residential robhery; Count 3, first degree burglary. The jury made a specific finding that a person was present during the commission of the first dearee burglary to be true. No ather findings were made. (1 CT 238.) The due process clause found in both the Fourteenth and Fifth amendments to the United States Constitution requires oroof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime in order to convict the accused. This should hold true for felony murder cases, but the doctrine of felony murder circumvents this important principle and allows for conviction and punishment to be the same as for those who committed a murder with malice aforathnught. DID THE TRIAL COURT PERMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY ALLOWING THE JURY FIND FIRST DEGREE MURDER IN A CASE WHERE THEY MADE NO SPECIFIC FINDINGS CF FACT ON EACH AND EVERY REQUIRED ELEMENT OF THE OFFENCF.? , WAS PETITIONER GIVEN DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS WHEN THE PROSECUTOR WAS RELIEVED OF Ls PROVING ALL. ELEMENTS TO FIRST DEGREE MURDER BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT? : DID THE COURT OF APPEAL VINLATE THE PROSCRIPTION IN SANDSTROM? :