whether-state-courts-misapply-confrontation-clause

question presented is whether state courts misapply this Court’s clearly established authority in permitting the introduction of unconfronted, out-of-court, testimonial statements over a Confrontation Clause objection by applying a common dying declaration exception not endorsed by this Court. Contrary to the determination of the Ohio courts and the lower federal courts, this Court has never directly held that dying declarations are exempt from the protections of the Confrontation Clause. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358-9 (2008). Yet the Sixth Circuit elevated common law dying declarations to the same constitutionalized status occupied by the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, a question this Court reserved in Giles. In so doing, the Sixth Circuit noted this that question remains in “High Court limbo,” practically inviting this Court’s intervention. See Woods, 960 F.3d at 300. The second question presented is whether the state courts misapply this Court’s clearly established authority of the use of racially-motivated peremptory challenges when the state courts determine that a Batson error occurred at trial, but subsequently declare that error harmless. More specifically, this question asks whether Batson errors at the trial court level are structural, and therefore incapable of being harmless, or whether they can be overcome by subsequent curative actions by the trial court. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in this regard created a split between the Circuits on the nature of Batson errors, necessitating this Court’s involvement. Compare Woods, 290 F.3d at 303; McGahee v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections, 560 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11" Cir. 2009). i LIST OF DIRECTLY