Whether the Fourth Circuit violated this Court's directives on the Sixth Amendment's right to effective counsel when it rejected Sigmon's Martinez evidence as cumulative and insubstantial

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Martinez v. Ryan, 563 U.S. 1032 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013), this Court held that ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims defaulted by absent or ineffective state post-conviction counsel can be revived on federal habeas. This exception to Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), was rooted in the idea that petitioners should have the chance to press the critical constitutional claim of the right to effective representation at least once through competent counsel. To demonstrate cause under Martinez, a prisoner must show: (1) that appointed collateral counsel were ineffective under the standards of Strickland; and (2) “that the underlying claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Id. at 15 (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, (2003)) [emphasis added]. The Fourth Circuit in Sigmon v. Stirling, 956 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2020) held a detailed mitigation presentation by Martinez counsel that created a much richer understanding of capital petitioner Brad Keith Sigmon’s childhood abuse, mental health, remorse, and ability to adapt to prison could not pass this low bar of having “some merit.” Finding this new evidence cumulative, and as a matter of law insubstantial, they denied Sigmon an evidentiary hearing. Judge King dissented, strongly disagreeing with the majority’s characterization of the new evidence as “insubstantial,” as that could only mean “it does not have any merit or is wholly -ilwithout factual support” under this Court’s precedent, and responding to the question of whether Sigmon was entitled to an evidentiary hearing with an “emphatic yes.” Id. at 211, 212. The questions presented are: 1. Capital defendant Brad Sigmon presented additional mitigation evidence uncovered during a Martinez investigation that addressed the same general subject matter presented at the sentencing phase of trial in greater depth and detail. Did the Fourth Circuit, in a decision that widened an existing circuit split, violate this Court’s directives on the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective counsel when it rejected Sigmon’s Martinez evidence as cumulative, and as a matter of law insubstantial, simply because it covered similar topics as those presented at trial? 2. In considering whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a Martinez claim, does the requirement that evidence be substantial merely require a showing of some merit, as suggested by this Court, or must the reviewing court be convinced of a reasonable probability of a different outcome before allowing such a hearing?