Whether the denial of a defense motion for a continuance during the penalty phase of a capital trial violates due process

QUESTION PRESENTED At the penalty phase of Mr. Sealey’s capital trial, the State ended its case in aggravation earlier than expected. The defense made a motion for a brief continuance in order to secure the testimony of a vital witness who had not yet arrived from out of state, but the court denied the motion. The jury heard no witnesses in mitigation. Sealey was sentenced to death. The questions presented by the petition are: (1) What is the proper standard for determining whether a trial court’s denial of a defense motion for a continuance during the penalty phase of a capital trial violates due process and renders a capital trial fundamentally unfair? (2) What prejudice showing is required to obtain a new trial following an unconstitutional denial of a justifiable motion for a continuance? (3) In assessing the prejudice flowing from appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to raise a claim on appeal, must the reviewing court focus on the probability that the omitted claim would have resulted in reversal on appeal, as this Court held in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000), or must the reviewing court weigh whether there was a reasonable probability of a different verdict at trial in the absence of the underlying error, as the Eleventh Circuit held here? i