Whether a trial court has a duty to inquire into a conflict between a defendant and his attorney that implicates fundamental rights

question presented is: May a trial court ignore a conflict between a defendant and his attorney that implicates fundamental rights, or does Holloway v. Arkansas establish a duty on trial courts to inquire into that conflict when it is brought to their attention? See Sup. Ct. Rule 10(c). Question 2: During both of Carter’s trials, the jury heard that Carter’s parents occasionally disciplined him and that, on one occasion, his stepfather chained him to a bed. But the regularity and extent of the abuse Carter suffered was of a different order of magnitude. Had trial counsel conducted a reasonable i investigation, the jury would have learned that Carter was repeatedly beaten by his parents, frequently chained to cabin posts and beds, and kept in a makeshift jail cell. The Ninth Circuit held that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the state court reasonably concluded that trial counsel acted effectively in these capital cases even though they presented only a superficial glimpse of Carter’s horrendous childhood. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that presenting additional evidence of abuse could have “backfired” on trial counsel “by leading the jury to infer that the adult [defendant] was beyond rehabilitation.” The Ninth Circuit also held that the state court reasonably concluded that trial counsel acted effectively by not investigating or presenting evidence that their client suffered from Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) and brain damage, because that evidence could have opened the door to “unfavorable rebuttal testimony.” The question presented is: Did the Ninth Circuit’s opinion create a conflict with relevant decisions of this Court in concluding that capital defense counsel is effective under Strickland v. Washington when they fail to investigate and present powerful mitigation evidence at penalty, because 1) the jury could have potentially misconstrued some of that mitigating evidence; and 2) that mitigating evidence could have potentially opened the door to some aggravating evidence that paled in comparison to aggravating evidence the jury had already received about the defendant? See Sup. Ct. R. 10(c). ii Question 3: During post-conviction proceedings, habeas counsel unearthed a wealth of powerful mitigating evidence that trial counsel failed to investigate. In particular, habeas counsel discovered that Carter has brain damage, caused in part by FAS. The Ninth Circuit rejected Carter’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because it concluded that evidence of FAS and brain damage would not have made a difference at penalty. The question presented is: May a court assessing Strickland prejudice dismiss the significance of evidence of FAS and brain damage, as the Ninth Circuit did in this case and has done in other cases, or does evidence of brain damage have uniquely mitigating weight, as four other circuits have held? See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a). iii