May a bankruptcy court exponentially expand the Barton Doctrine?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. ; May a bankruptcy court apply the Barton Doctrine to its own proceedings and exponentially expand its authority under Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881) to include, without limitation, the power, authority and jurisdiction to: . 1. curtail, disrupt, or otherwise limit the jurisdiction of a state court to review, reverse, or modify its own state-court orders and judgments; . 2. treat the Barton Doctrine as a procedural bar to suits against a U.S. trustee, his counsel, his co-defendants, and any defendant it wishes to shield from liability; 3. exercise special authority or jurisdiction over, and prohibit suit against, defendants who are not and were never “court-appointed” fiduciaries of any court; 4. prohibit suits against a U.S. trustee, his counsel, and his co-defendants in their individual capacities for ultra vires acts clearly exceeding the scope of a trustee's duties and/or for engaging in tortious and criminal misconduct during a 9-month to 3-year period prior to the operation of a bankruptcy case and before there was any estate to administer; 5. fashion “Barton injunctions” where no requisite for the issuance of a permanent injunction is satisfied and no evidence suggests an enjoined action would “impede, impair, or irreparably interfere with” the administration of a bankruptcy estate; 6. prohibit all courts of competent jurisdiction from adjudicating “non-core” claims over which bankruptcy courts lack jurisdiction, and/or “core-proceedings” in which a jury-trial is demanded, from being raised in a court of competent jurisdiction; 7. adjudicate “non-core” claims over which it lacks jurisdiction by dismissing them with prejudice and/or prohibit “core-proceedings” from being brought in the bankruptcy court; ; and 8. prohibit secured creditors from pursuing timely filed claims in a bankruptcy case? 2. Are violations of 11 U.S.C. §362(a) void ab initio or are they merely “voidable” transgressions capable of “retroactive validation?” If inadvertent violations are merely “voidable,” (1) Are intentional actions in knowing and willful violation of 11 U.S.C. §362(a) also capable of “retroactive rehabilitation” and/or other discretionary cures? (2) If so, is the result the same where third-parties, with no standing or interest in a Chapter 7 case, commit these acts for the express purpose of defrauding creditors? And, (3) What effect does “retroactive rehabilitation” have on 11 U.S.C. §362(k)? Are individuals injured by “retroactively rehabilitated” violations still entitled to recover actual and punitive damages? If not, what remedies or remedial measures are substituted for those available under 11 U.S.C. §362(k)? fi PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING John L. Howell, pro se (“John”) Elise LaMartina, pro se (“Elise”) David V. Adler, U.S. Trustee (“Adler”) Adler s David J. Messina, Fernand L. Laudumiey IV Chaffe McCall, L.L.P. Gordon, Arata, Montgomery, Barnett, McCollam, Duplantis, & Eagan, LLC, Leslie S. Bolner, Glen R. Galbraith, Seale & Ross, PLC. David J. Messina, pro se (“Messina”) Fernand L. Laudumiey IV, pro se (“Laudumiey”) Glen R. Galbraith, pro se (“Galbraith”) Leslie S. Bolner, pro se (“Bolner’) Gordon, Arata, Montgomery, Barnett, McCollam, Duplantis, & Eagan, LLC(““GAMB”) Its Counsel: C. Peck Hayne Jr. Chaffe McCall, L.L.P. (“Chaffe McCall’) Its Counsel: David J. Messina, Fernand L. Laudumiey IV Seale & Ross, PLC (“Seale & Ross”) Its Counsel: Glen R. Galbraith, Leslie S. Bolner Lake Villas Number 2 Homeowners Association, Inc. (“LV2”) Its Counsel: Glen R. Galbraith, Lesli S. Bolner, Seal & Ross, PLC Donald H. Grodsky, pro se (“Grodsky”) Office of United States Trustee (“OUST”) Its Counsel: US. Attorney, Peter G. Strasser Assistant U.S. Attorney, Glenn K. Schreiber