Does the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bar a 42 USC 1983 claim when a facial challenge is pled?

QUESTION PRESENTED The questions presented arise out of separation of powers. Under 42 USC 1983 Petitioner sued in US District Court (Dist. Nebr.) the justices of the Nebraska Supreme Court and its Counsel for Discipline for taking his license to practice law (property) without due process of law. The Due Process and Privileges and Immunities clauses of the Fourteenth -Amendment to the US Constitution, and Article V Sec. 4 (states required to have a Republican Form of Government), mandate separation of powers in the taking of private property. The gravamen of Petitioner's US District Court case was the total lack of separation in the Nebraska attorney disciplinary discipline process between the judicial functions of the Nebraska Supreme Court in determining (then sanctioning) if attorneys have violated legal ethical rules also legislated by them, where the executive functions of ; investigating and prosecution are conducted by their Counsel for Discipline— who is directly employed and supervised by them. Petitioner’s facial claim was brought in US District Court after the Nebraska Supreme Court revoked his license, but before all state proceedings including a motion for rehearing were concluded. The questions presented are: 1. Does Rooker-Feldman* doctrine bar Petitioner's 42 USC 1983 US District Court claim where Petitioner pled a facial as opposed to an as applied challenge? *Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 2 . 2. If Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable because Petitioner pled a facial as opposed to as applied challenge, did Petitioner have standing to bring his 42 USC 1983 US District Court claim? 3. If Petitioner inadvertently pled in the US District Court a 42 USC 1983 as applied challenge, were the state court proceedings “concluded” to bar Petitioner's claim under Rooker-Feldman? There is no meaningful opportunity for attorneys to defend themselves from allegations of misconduct where a state’s highest court legislates attorney conduct, where its Counsel for Discipline both investigates and prosecutes misconduct, and where the court also adjudicates and punishes misconduct. Without the ability to mount a meaningful defense, the attorney ; disciplinary process may be weaponized by opposing counsel or those wishing ; to deter an attorney from advocating causes of his client or of his own. Lawyers who represent unpopular clients and/or advocate for racial justice, religious freedom, LGBTQ rights, free speech, and other causes may then be improperly sidelined through the abuse of an attorney disciplinary process devoid of meaningful due process. Upon information and belief this happened to the Petitioner. Lawyers who mount a defense in a Nebraska disciplinary proceeding, instead of accepting the Counsel for Discipline’s recommended sanctions, are severely punished. Defendant lawyers are never exonerated by the Nebraska Supreme Court—which for a fair system would ; be statistically improbable. : 3