Whether a state arbitration law that provides a stricter mandate than Congress intended is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act and the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2

QUESTION PRESENTED The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., was enacted for the purpose of ensuring that arbitration agreements are valid and enforced. The FAA covers employment agreements that require arbitration to resolve workrelated disputes. Congress intended the FAA to protect the enforcement of arbitration agreements as agreed to by the contracting parties. Most states have enacted laws that uphold the validity of arbitration agreements; however, numerous legal questions have arisen that resulted in several cases before the Court. A case of first impression in the State of Tennessee is an unresolved legal question. The FAA provides, “Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon the adverse party or [her] attorney within three months after the award is filed or delivered.” 9 U.S.C. § 12. However, Tennessee state law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-312 provides, “Upon application of a party, the court shall confirm an award, unless, within the time limits hereinafter imposed, grounds are urged for vacating or modifying or correcting the award[.]” The difference between the FAA and the adoption of the FAA by the State of Tennessee is significant, because “grounds” is more specific and unyielding to proper dispute than “notice.” The FAA merely requires notice of a motion to vacate or modify within the 90-day time limit; whereas, § 312 mandates that a dissatisfied party assert all relevant grounds for modification or vacation. The question presented is: Whether a state arbitration law that provides a stricter mandate than Congress intended is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act and the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. i