Whether the government's warrantless seizure and search of a person's cell phone data violates the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1 The jurors deliberating about Larry Durant’s guilt or innocence informed the trial judge they were splint eight to convict, three to acquit, with one juror not deliberating. Addressing the jurors, the trial judge branded the non-deliberating juror “not helpful to the situation at all” because the juror might “ensure that we have a mistrial if you continue to refuse to even vote even if the 11 other folks do reach a unanimous decision.” The trial judge also instructed, “So in light of that, let me send you back. However long it is you want to take this evening, we'll be here as long as you want to be here. You know, I’ll leave it at that.” Less than 34 minutes after receiving these instructions, the jurors convicted Larry Durant of second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. Was this instruction unconstitutionally coercive under the Sixth Amendment, Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), and its progeny? I. Ulanda McRae testified for the prosecution at Larry Durant’s jury trial. Based on a mistake in spelling McRae’s last name, the prosecutor informed defense counsel that McRae did not have a criminal history. After trial, defense counsel learned McRae had a criminal history and moved for a new trial, alleging a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). After holding the prosecution violated Brady, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held McRae’s criminal history was not material under Brady and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985), based on the other evidence presented by the prosecution and without considering the evidence presented by the defense. Did the Supreme Court of South Carolina apply the correct standard of review for materiality of McRae’s criminal history when it failed to consider the evidence presented by Larry Durant? i