Christopher J. Spreitz v. David Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry
HabeasCorpus Punishment
When must the court of appeals remand to a court of first instance for application of this Court's intervening decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), to determine whether the ineffective assistance of post-conviction relief counsel excuses the procedural default of facts supporting a substantial trial counsel ineffectiveness claim
QUESTIONS PRESENTED | In Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005), this Court vacated a death sentence | on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where counsel was apprised that | the prosecution would admit the defendant’s prior conviction and, although counsel | had access to material in the prosecution’s files that would have mitigated that | conviction, failed to taken any action thereon. Here a presentence report was | tendered to Spreitz’s counsel that showed Spreitz to have ingested cocaine in close | temporal proximity to the crime — which was in addition to his alcohol consumption shown by the trial evidence. The cocaine use and the resultant metabolite cocaethylene negatively affected Spreitz’s cognitive functioning. This compelling i mitigation went uninvestigated by both trial and state post-conviction relief counsel. The Questions Presented are: When must the court of appeals remand to a court of first instance for | application of this Court’s intervening decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 | U.S. 1 (2012), to determine whether the ineffective assistance of post| conviction relief counsel excuses the procedural default of facts supporting a substantial trial counsel ineffectiveness claim; and, Whether the Ninth Circuit’s denial of Spreitz’s request for remand / pursuant to Martinez deprived Spreitz of the opportunity to | demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default of | facts supporting a substantial ineffective assistance of trial counsel / claim, where counsel failed to present evidence of the effects of cocaine / and cocaethylene intoxication at the time of the crime that significantly | impaired Spreitz’s “capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his | conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law,” a | statutory mitigating factor under the Arizona death penalty statute. | | | |