Whether a petitioner in post-conviction proceedings asserting a procedurally defaulted structural error can demonstrate prejudice by showing that the error rendered their trials fundamentally unfair

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW This case involves the intersection of structural errors and the proceduraldefault doctrine. Typically, when a state court declines to adjudicate a claim for failure to follow a procedural rule, federal habeas petitioners must show cause and prejudice before the federal court can review the merits of the claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). But when the defaulted claim is structural, petitioners will struggle to obtain federal review of the claim because structural errors “affect[] the framework within which the trial proceeds,” and therefore “defy analysis by harmless-error standards.” Arizona v. Fulimante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991) Gnternal quotation marks omitted). Although some structural errors do not always render the criminal proceedings fundamentally unfair, others do. See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 8. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017). This petition presents the following question warranting this Court’s review: (1) After Weaver, can a petitioner in post-conviction proceedings asserting a procedurally defaulted structural error demonstrate prejudice by showing that the error rendered their trials fundamentally unfair? ii