Billy S. Jeffries v. Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, et al.
DueProcess Punishment Privacy
Whether a court evaluating an ex post facto challenge to a statute that has previously been found to be nonpunitive and has since been amended should review the entire statute holistically in its current form, as several jurisdictions have done, or whether stare decisis and related concepts requires that the court presume the statute is nonpunitive and review only the amendments
QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2008), this Court found that Alaska’s sex offender registration statute was a “civil regulatory scheme” which was “nonpunitive.” The statute evaluated in Smith required little more than that the offender keep their address current, and that the address information be placed on a public registry. However, since that time, largely driven by Federal policies, states like Kentucky have used the status of being a registered sex offender to impose increasing restrictions on travel, movement and conduct, so much so that in 2017 this Court took note of the “. . .troubling fact that the law imposes severe restrictions on persons who already have served their sentence and are no longer subject to the supervision of the criminal justice system .” Packingham v. North Carolina, __ U.S. ___, 187 8.Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). Courts have split on how to handle challenges to those restrictions, with the majority reviewing each amendment individually and generally finding the amendment to be nonpunitive, but a growing minority reviewing the statutory scheme in its entirety anew to determine whether it remains nonpunitive, and frequently finding that the statute is now punitive for ex post facto purposes. Likewise, cases have split as to the extent, if any, that courts should consider the fact that the offender is a juvenile or that scientific studies fail to find merit to the non-punitive rationale factor into a constitutional analysis of sex offender registration statutes. This case presents the following questions: 1. Whether a court evaluating an ex post facto challenge to a statute that has previously been found to be nonpunitive and has since been amended should review the entire statute holistically in its current form, as several jurisdictions have done, or whether stare decisis and related concepts requires that the court presume the statute is nonpunitive and review only the amendments? 2. Whether the imposition of sex offender registration and accompanying disabilities can be retroactively imposed on a juvenile offender without violating the Due Process Clause or ex post facto provisions, where scientific evidence establishes that registration is contrary to the state’s asserted public safety interest, and the system in its current form imposes a number of probation-like conditions? “il