Where a court-appointed mental health expert assures a criminal defendant that the evidence gathered in his psychological evaluation will not be used against him as evidence of guilt at his capital trial, does the State's subsequent introduction of that evidence against him exceed the scope permitted by the Fifth Amendment as set forth in Estelle and its progeny?

QUESTION PRESENTED After pleading not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, the trial court ordered Petitioner Ryan Petersen to be evaluated by a court-appointed expert, chosen by the prosecution. At the outset of the evaluation, the expert misinformed Mr. Petersen that“none of the information could be used as evidence against him concerning his guilt on any charge.” Despite this assurance, the State called this expert to testify against Mr. Petersen at the culpability phase of his capital trial and the entire contents of his report, including the results of Mr. Petersen’s competency evaluation, were admitted into evidence. In Estelle v. Smith, this Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment protects defendants in the context of pre-trial psychological evaluations. 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981). Later, in Buchanan v. Kentucky, this Court held that where a defendant puts his mental state at issue he may waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination for limited rebuttal purposes. 483 U.S. 402, 424 (1987). This case presents a question left unresolved by Estelle and Buchanan about constraints on the State’s ability to obtain and introduce limited psychological evidence in rebuttal and this Court should grant certiorari to decide the following: Where a court-appointed mental health expert assures a criminal defendant that the evidence gathered in his psychological evaluation will not be used against him as evidence of guilt at his capital trial, does the State’s subsequent introduction of that evidence against him exceed the scope permitted by the Fifth Amendment as set forth in Estelle and its progeny? i