Does the Martinez exception apply when post-conviction counsel's deficient representation resulted in a procedural default?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 12 (2012), this Court reaffirmed the right to effective representation “is a bedrock principle in our justice system.” To ensure that right is protected, this Court held that a habeas corpus petitioner establishes “cause” to excuse a state procedural default by demonstrating that “appointed counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, where the claim should have been raised, was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984).” Id. at 14. Lower federal courts’ inconsistent application of Martinez, however, has undermined this Court’s clear instruction. First, the circuits differ on the types of deficient representation in initial post-conviction proceedings that qualify as “cause.” Some circuits, including the lower court here, limit the Martinez exception to cases in which post-conviction counsel failed to plead a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Other courts apply Martinez to any deficient representation that results in a procedural default—including the failure to develop and present evidence in support of such claims. Second, lower courts diverge in their treatment of claims that differ from those raised by state post-conviction counsel. The Sixth Circuit and other courts, apply a talismanic approach, precluding a Martinez inquiry of any unpled Sixth Amendment claim whenever a Sixth Amendment claim was presented in state court. Other courts employ well-established exhaustion principles to determine whether the claim raised in federal court is the same claim presented to the state courts. These inconsistent applications of Martinez have created splits among the circuits and require this Court’s clarification. The questions presented are: 1. Does “cause” exist to excuse a procedural default when state post-conviction counsel’s unreasonable and prejudicial failure to present any evidence to support a claim “caused a procedural default in an initial-review collateral proceeding,” Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14? 2. Whether the Martinez “cause” exception applies when post-conviction counsel raised a Sixth Amendment claim, but failed to plead or present the specific legal theory and facts of the distinct claim raised in federal court? i