Whether the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) permits use of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to present new evidence of racial discrimination in a federal death sentence

QUESTIONS PRESENTED (CAPITAL CASE) When Petitioner, a Black man, was sentenced to death in a Texas federal courtroom after the prosecution struck four out of five Black prospective jurors (while knowing the defense would strike the fifth for her strong pro-death penalty views) and provided purportedly “race-neutral” reasons for each strike. Years after Petitioner’s trial, and after relief had been denied on his § 2255 motion, this Court concluded in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), that one of Petitioner’s prosecutors, Paul Macaluso, had struck Black jurors based on their race, and then lied about doing so, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 69 (1986). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently concluded that Macaluso had done the same in another case, Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364 (2009). Because Miller-El and Reed were not decided until Petitioner’s § 2255 habeas proceedings concluded, and because he does not meet the standard for filing a successive § 2255 petition, which requires either new evidence of actual innocence or a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by this Court, Petitioner raised this Batson claim via the “savings clause” of § 2255(e) through a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. §2241. The district court agreed that Petitioner's Batson allegations stated an "extremely serious" claim of constitutional error, but concluded that Petitioner was barred from (i) ll raising the claim via a § 2241 petition. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The questions presented are: 1. Does 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) permit use of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as a vehicle to present new evidence that a federal death sentence is tainted by racial discrimination when 28 U.S.C. § 2255 otherwise provides no avenue to present such evidence for consideration? 2. Does executing a Black prisoner whose conviction and death sentence were procured through intentional race discrimination constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice, which overrides any procedural limitation on raising a Batson claim for review in federal court?