Should the constitutional guarantees afforded to prisoners be tied to the constitutional violations raised, instead of to the manner in which a state defines its pleading requirements and procedures?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED This Court has extended constitutional protections to the indigent on the first appeal of right, “[flor there can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys depends on the amount of money he has.” Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (internal quotation omitted). Those same constitutional guarantees are not available to the indigent when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). Because Ohio prohibits the filing of certain constitutional claims on direct review, the discrimination recognized in Douglas effectively still exists for Ohio indigent defendants with regard to many of their constitutional claims. A law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. On direct review, the Supreme Court of Ohio would not consider Maxwell’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. On collateral review of that claim, the Ohio courts failed to provide Maxwell with the process prescribed by Ohio’s own postconviction statute. Ohio’s indigent prisoners are without the process they should be due, simply because of the procedural pleading requirements in Ohio. Should the constitutional guarantees afforded to prisoners be tied to the constitutional violations raised, instead of to the manner in which a state defines its pleading requirements and procedures? When state courts do not fulfill their responsibility to provide adequate collateral review, acting contra to their own state statutes, do they violate the due process rights of prisoners? i