Whether the categorical approach requires federal courts to defer to a state supreme court's interpretation of state law when determining if a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act

QUESTIONS PRESENTED To decide whether a prior burglary conviction qualifies as a predicate violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), “courts compare the elements of the crime of conviction with the elements of the ‘generic’ version of the listed offense—i.e., the offense as commonly understood.” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2247 (2016). “[T]he prior crime qualifies as an ACCA predicate if, but only if, its elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.” Jd. This categorical approach” “demand[s] .. . certainty when identifying a generic offense.” Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 18, 21 (2005). 1. When applying the categorical approach, federal courts are “bound by” a state supreme court’s “interpretation of state law, including its determination of the elements” of the prior crime. Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 1388 (2010); accord James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 205-206 (2007). Does “Taylor's demand for certainty” apply to federal courts’ application and interpretation of state-court decisional law? 2. Where a state statute explicitly defines “burglary” in a way that does not require proof of an intent to commit a crime, and thus lacks an element necessary to satisfy Taylor’s generic definition of “burglary,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)Gi), is that facial overbreadth enough to demonstrate that the crime is non-generic, or must a federal defendant also prove that the state has convicted someone who did not, in fact, harbor specific intent? i