Whether an indigent defendant has standing to claim a deprivation of the First Amendment right to petition the court

Question(s) Presented Georgia state law O.C.G.A. 17-9-61 provides the following: (a) When a judgement has been rendered, either party may move in arrest thereof for any defect not amendable which appears on the face of the record or pleadings. (b) A motion in arrest of judgement must be made during the term at which judgement was obtained. The United States Constitution First Amendment reads in relevant part which guarantees the "right of the people... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances". 1. The question is whether an indigent defendant whose representation by appointed trial counsel terminates at the end of sentencing, whom intends to exercise the right to file a motion in arrest, however does not have post conviction appellate counsel appointed by the court until well after the end of the term of court as judgement entered, does that defendant have standing to claim a deprivation of the First Amendment right to petition the court l(a) Whether under the aforementioned circumstances does an indigent defendant have standing to claim a deprivation of effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, for not being appointed appellate counsel at a critical stage pre-appeal; (b) and as the designated class, do indigent defendants have standing to claim violations of both Due Process of the Law and Equal Protection of the Law in accord with the a } Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution for not being appointed appellate counsel at the same term of court judgement was obtained, ultimately not making the 17-9-61 filing and hearing of the motion in arrest available to counsel nor defendant. 2. Under Georgia state law, when a claim that an indictment is absolutely void is not properly asserted in the trial court, it can only be reviewed on appeal through a Habeas Corpus proceedings. A motion for new trial is not a proper proceeding for raising questions as to the legal sufficiency of an indictment, and provides nothing for review on appeal. Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 583 (2018). The question is whether the Eleventh Circuit has misinterpreted and misapplied the governing standard for assessment for a Certificate of Appealability as set forth in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003), by deferring to and adopting the district courts and lower state courts ruling and findings, all of which defer to the trial courts findings from a Motion For New Trial final order, a court to which the state law establishes has no subject matter jurisdiction over the claims submitted before the magistrate, district court and Eleventh Circuit. ii € * iii